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Based on the existing literature covering Sino-Western business negotiations, this paper is an
effort to distinguish Chinese entities' negotiation styles based upon their ownership structure. Par-
ticularly, this paper reviews the specific issues that exist in business negotiations between Western
firms and Chinese State-owned enterprises (SOEs). Such issues involving Chinese SOEs' unique
motivations, communication patterns, and decision-making processes arise from the significant role
the Chinese government plays with respect to its SOEs, and also the complex transition period in
which the SOEs are operating and the various reforms they are carrying out. In response to the
unique issues presented by Chinese SOEs, this paper attempts to explore possible solutions available
to Western firms before, during, and after their business negotiations with Chinese SOEs.
I. Introduction
Since the People's Republic of China (PRC or China) adopted its "reform and open-
up" policy in late 1978, "Western business communities have been enthusiastic about
China-the world's largest emerging market with more than one billion consumers."'
According to the World Trade Organization, "China surpassed the United Sates as the
world's second-largest exporter in the middle of [2006]."2 In 2006, China approved
41,485 foreign-invested enterprises and attracted foreign investment totaling 69.468 bil-
lion US dollars.3 Negotiations with the Chinese, however, have frequently been described
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as particularly difficult for Westerners, given the unique features China possesses and the
special challenges it offers.
A. LrT-uRTui REVIEW
In response to the increase in Sino-Western business transactions, as well as Westerners'
surprise and confusion regarding the Chinese negotiation style, a special area of literature
has gradually developed since the 1980s concerning international business negotiation be-
tween the Chinese and Westerners-authors include Pye, Macleod, Blackman, Goh, Lam,
Ghauri and Fang, Lee, and Lam and Graham.4 The majority of these authors' works take
a socio-cultural approach to facilitate better understanding of the Chinese business nego-
tiation style.
Pye lays a foundation by identifying the three major sources of difficulty in Sino-West-
ern business negotiations. 5 Goh states that the major divergence between the Chinese and
Western negotiation styles is that "the former tend[s] towards a relational approach, and
the latter adopt[s] a transactional approach" and further points out that the "main cultural
reasons behind such a divergence [are] collectivism/individualism, and high-context/low-
context communication patterns".6 Blackman provides insightful case studies of Wes-
terners' business negotiations with Chinese. 7 Fang establishes that the Chinese business
culture framework consists of three distinctive and interrelated components: the PRC
condition,8 Confucianism, and Chinese stratagems. 9 Ghauri and Usunier nicely re-cap-
tured Fang's model as follows:
[The] Chinese business culture framework suggests that the Chinese negotiators have
a "three-in-one" negotiation style; they negotiate like "bureaucrats," "gentlemen,"
and "strategists." Trust is a prime indicator showing which role the Chinese are go-
ing to play. When mutual trust between the business partners is high, the Chinese
will negotiate as "gentlemen;" when it is low, they will negotiate as strategists! The
4. See generally RODERICK MACLEOD, CHINA, INc.: How TO Do BUSINESS WITH THE CHINESE
(Bantan Books 1988); CAROLYN BLACKMAN, NEGOTIATING CHINA: CASE STUDIES AND STRATEGIES (St.
Leonards, NSW, Australia 1997); Bee Chen Goh, Sino-Western Negotiating Styles, 7 CANTERBURY L. REV. 82
(1998); MARIA LAI-LING LAM, WORKING WITH CHINESE EXPATRIATES IN BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS:
PORTRAITS, ISSUES, AND APPLICATIONS (Quorum 2000); Ghauri & Fang, supra note 1; CHARLES LEE, COW-
BOYS AND DRAGONS: SHAYiFERING CULTURAL MYTHS TO ADVANCE CHINESE-AMERICAN BUSINESS
(Dearborn Trade Pub. 2003); N. MARK LAM & JOHN L. GRAHAM, CHINA Now: DOING BUSINESS IN THE
WORLD'S MOST DYNAMIC MARKET (McGraw-Hill 2007).
5. PERVEZ N. GHAURI & JEAN-CLAUDE USUNIER, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS 413 (2nd
ed. 2003). According to Pye, the "three major sources of difficulty in Sino-Westem business negotiations are
... •ll problems that arise from the newness of the relations and the lack of experience on both sides, [2]
problems inherent in capitalist enterprises seeking to do business [within a] socialist economy [experiencing]
uncertain transition and reform, and [3] problems that arise from the differences between the Chinese and
Western cultures." Id.
6. Goh, spra note 4 at 82.
7. BLACKMAN, supra note 4.
8. Under Fang's model, the "PRC condition" is comprised of eight variables: politics, economic planning,
legal framework, technology, great size, backwardness, rapid change, and Chinese bureaucracy. See GHAURI
& USUNIER, supra note 5, at 416.
9. Under Fang's model, the term "Chinese stratagems" refers to a long-lasting Chinese cultural tradition
that shapes the strategic Chinese business behavior, deriving from its world's earliest treaties on military
strategy-ART OF WAR by Sun Tzu.
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PRC negotiators also negotiate as "bureaucrats," particularly so when the political
wind blows.io
B. LIMITATION OF EXISTING LITERATURE
Although the rich existing literature on Sino-Western business negotiation has offered a
useful framework and tool-sets to facilitate cross-cultural understanding, there is a shared
temptation to over-generalize Chinese negotiation styles, or to only limitedly distinguish
them by geography.I There is a lack of literature that attempts to distinguish the negoti-
ation styles of Chinese entities by their ownership structure.
In fact, Chinese enterprises can generally be categorized into three sub-groups based on
the nature of their controlling shareholders: (1) SOEs, (2) privately-owned enterprises
(POEs), and (3) foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). These three types of Chinese entities
can be dramatically distinct from each other in terms of organizational culture, manage-
ment motivations, and control systems, and these distinctions can lead to different features
in their negotiations with Western firms.
C. WHY CHINESE SOEs?
Under the PRC law, the term Chinese SOEs refers to Chinese companies whose assets
are owned by the state, in which the State Council and the local people's governments
perform, on behalf of the state, the contributor's duties and enjoy the owner's rights and
interests. 12 This paper is focused on further analyzing business negotiations between
Westerners and Chinese SOEs (as opposed to the other two entity types) due to the fol-
lowing two major reasons.
First, as compared to Chinese POEs (which are primarily run by private entrepreneurs
and accordingly more market-driven) and FIEs (which are primarily controlled by foreign
investors and therefore more westernized), the gap between Chinese SOEs and Western
firms seems larger, especially given the unique issues Chinese SOEs face due to their
complicated reform histories, ownership structures, organizational culture, and incentive
systems. All of these issues provide particular challenges with respect to achieving effec-
tive communication between Western firms and Chinese SOEs.
Second, Chinese SOEs are the major players in China's increasing outbound invest-
ment activities, which are "intended to improve their competitiveness both globally and at
home, seeking to acquire brand names, technology, distribution networks and even human
resources."
13 According to statistics published by China's central government, the aggre-
gate amount of outbound direct investment by Chinese companies grew to $21.16 billion
10. GHAURi & USUNIER, supra note 5, at 421-22.
11. L xs & GRAHAxM, supra note 4.
12. See Article 2, Qi ye guo you zi chan jian du guan li zan xin tiao li [Provisional Measures for the Supervi-
sion and Administration over the State-Owned Assets of Enterprises] (promulgated by the State Council,
May 27, 2003, effective May 27, 2003).
13. Aihong Yu, Howard Chao & Michael Dorf, Outbound Investment by Chinese Companies: The Chinese
Government Approval Regime, Topics IN CHINESE LAW, O'MELVFNY & MYERS, LLP (2005).
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in 2006, 26 percent of which was carried out by Chinese SOEs. 14 This trend obviously
anticipates more encounters between Chinese SOEs and Western firms.
As stated, the goal of this paper is to analyze the specific issues surrounding business
transactions between Western firms and Chinese SOEs and then suggest possible solu-
tions to facilitate effective communication and business transactions between the two enti-
ties. To achieve this purpose, this paper draws on the empirical experiences of
intermediary professionals and in-house councils of several Chinese SOEs in business ne-
gotiations representing Chinese SOEs and Western clients.
15
II. Backgrounds of Chinese SOEs
In order to better understand the specific issues that may exist in business negotiations
between Chinese SOEs and Western firms, it is helpful to have some background on
Chinese SOEs.
A. THE GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN CHWNESE SOEs
First, because the central or local government "perform[s] contributor's duties, and en-
joy[s] the owner's rights and interests" in Chinese SOEs, the government's role should
never be neglected or underestimated.' 6 As noted above, the PRC condition is an impor-
tant component of Fang's Chinese business-culture framework. This is particularly true
for Chinese SOEs. As one scholar noted:
At the centre of the PRC condition lies the theme of Chinese bureaucracy which
features red tape [more often, decision making requires consensus at various levels
crossing various departments] as well as quick buying (e.g., [when politics require a
quick deal and] when your products fit in with the government's priority
categories). 17
As compared with POEs and FIEs, Chinese SOEs are more obliged or expected to
follow the Chinese government's policies and plans to do business. As one of the inter-
viewees indicated, "the reason why it is so emphasized in China to separate the functions
of government and enterprises for SOEs is precisely because these two are severely co-
mingled in practice."' 8
B. CHINESE SOEs iN TRANSITION
Historically, China's SOEs were wholly owned by the government. Starting from the
early 1990s, the central government began to reform its SOEs by listing some large ones
14. Ministry of Comm., State Admin. of Foreign Exchange, & National Bureau of Statistics (P.R.C.), 2006
nian du zhongguo dui wai zhi jie tou zi tong ji gong bao [2006 Statistical Bulletin of China's Outward Foreign
Direct Investment) (2007), available at http://hzs.mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/200709/1190343657984.pdf.
15. Identities of these interviewees cannot be disclosed due to confidentiality arrangement with the
interviewees.
16. See Provisional Measures for the Supervision and Administration over the State-Owned Assets of En-
terprises art. 2.
17. GHAusi & USITNIER, supra note 5, at 417.
18. See disclaimer, supra note 15.
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and selling off certain smaller ones. 19 The remaining SOEs are mainly mega-firms in
strategically significant sectors, such as financial institutions, automobile industries, tele-
communications, and petrochemicals. Such Chinese SOEs, however, have been faced
with drastic internal and external changes.
Internally, management of Chinese SOEs was recently "given [relative] autonomy over
pricing, investment, accounting, human resources, material supply and acquisition, and
other decisions related to [their] operations, [all of] which were absent under the former
planned economy in China."2 0 Externally, since the 1980s when China began to convert
itself into a market economy, Chinese SOEs have been exposed to a much more competi-
tive market with pressure from both domestic private sector and foreign direct investment
in China. As one author noted, "[t]he emergence of the domestic private sector [which
increased the number of more market-driven POEs], as well as the growth of [more west-
ernized FIEs], has brought unprecedented challenges" to Chinese SOEs. 2 1 Furthermore,
China's accession to the World Trade Organization in 2002 has invited more foreign di-
rect competition within formerly protected sectors such as financial institutions, automo-
bile industries, and pharmaceuticals, which are the major sectors in which Chinese SOEs
participate. 2
2
Facing such challenges, Chinese SOEs have been under a series of reforms since the
1980s (including the introduction of foreign strategic investment in Chinese SOEs to in-
crease their efficiency and the establishment of Western corporate governance systems
within Chinese SOEs, among other reforms). Such reforms can be bottom-up or top-
down, market-driven or government-mandated, but, all in all, they have to go through the
process by trial and error. Therefore, Chinese SOEs are in transition.
During this transition period, it is inevitable that the pre-reform planned economy
under which Chinese SOEs had been operating for decades and the market-oriented prac-
tices that Chinese SOEs desired to develop in the face of the above-mentioned challenges
will intersect. What further complicates the situation is that different Chinese SOEs may
have adopted various means of reform, with the same type of reform being carried out to
different degrees and having distinct impacts in various specific cases. As one of the inter-
viewees commented, "Chinese SOEs can be very different from each other, depending on
various factors, such as whether it is a public company, which industry it operates in, and
how such industry is regulated by the government, and whether it has foreign strategic
investor at the corporate level."
23
I. Specific Issues with Chinese SOEs
Apart from the widely-recognized issues effecting Sino-Western business negotiations
(such as the relational/transactional approach, collectivism/individualism, and the high-
context/low-context communication patterns as described by Goh), the interactions be-
19. David A. Ralston et al., Today's State-Owned Enterprises of China: Are They Dying Dinosaurs or Dynamic
Dynamos?, 27 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 825, 827 (2006).
20. Id. at 827-28.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See disclaimer, supra note 15.
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tween Chinese SOEs and Western firms present specific issues, particularly in terms of the
different motivations, communication styles, and decision making processes of each entity.
A. MOTIVATIONS
From a Western perspective, the goal of a business organization is to create economic
wealth and maximize the benefits to shareholders. Therefore, Western firms are primarily
profit-driven, and executive compensation, being comprised of performance-based bo-
nuses and equity-based option plans, is primarily linked with the companies'
performance. 2
4
By contrast, Chinese SOEs have much more complicated incentive systems, combined
with the government's significant role in Chinese SOEs, as mentioned above. The moti-
vations of Chinese SOEs' executives in business negotiations are far greater than merely
profit-making. Other factors, such as the overall political environment, compliance with
policy guidelines, and even the deal's impact on the executive's personal political career
path, will have an inevitable impact on the Chinese SOEs' business negotiations with
Western firms. Furthermore, these various motivations are generally interlinked.
Whether signing the deal has a positive or negative effect on the political career of Chi-
nese SOEs' representatives is closely related to the then-applicable PRC condition (partic-
ularly the overall political environment) and whether the deal is in line with the policy
guidelines issued, publicly and/or internally, by central and/or local governments.
Due to the complicated motivations of Chinese SOEs' executives, they tend to be more
risk-averse because they have too much at stake, and without a high level of precaution,
they cannot manage all of the interlinked motivational factors correctly. As one of the
interviewees who had been working with a large Chinese SOE commented, "executives in
Chinese SOEs tend to be 'risk avoiders', and they would rather do nothing than make a
mistake as too much is at the stake for them. ' 25
B. COMMUNICATIONS
Lee illustrates how serious the miscommunication can become between Western and
Chinese negotiators merely due to eye contact. The deal can "go south" because an
American's attempt to "show great interest [and] be earnest" by using firm eye contact
may be misinterpreted by the Chinese, whose custom is to "show respect... by avoiding
direct eye contact."26 Apart from such cultural differences between Westerners and Chi-
nese, it should be noted that Chinese SOEs have their own language system and behav-
ioral customs, which may not be well understood by outsiders (even Chinese who lack
previous experience in government authorities or SOEs may be unfamiliar with this
system).
First, such communications can be very vague. For example, after reviewing a project
proposal, executives of Chinese SOEs are likely to say something along the lines of: "let's
take a look" or "it appears fairly feasible." Such comments do not give a definitive answer,
24. See generally WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER KRAAKIMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN, COMMENTFARIES
AND CASES ON TIHE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION (Aspen Publishers 2007).
25. See disclaimer, srpra note 15.
26. LEE, supra note 4, at 11.
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nor do they provide the type of detail a Western firm would expect, such as how long the
project will take and whether the project's goals are satisfied or not. As one intermediary
service provider mentioned in the interviews, "Western firms may find it very difficult to
figure out what such unclear words really mean."2 7
Second, given that executives of Chinese SOEs are driven by a mix of complicated and
interlinked motivations, they may create an argument to support their internal decisions
if, from their perspective, the real reason behind those decisions cannot be directly
stated.28 This is partly the reason why some Western negotiators complain that their
Chinese counterparts resort to "false authority." 29 Such use of "false authority" is also
partly due to the two-level game being played by the Chinese SOEs, as further discussed
below.
Furthermore, as much literature has highlighted the importance of saving face to the
Chinese, this is particularly salient for Chinese SOEs, because executives of Chinese SOEs
are usually former governmental officials, and they may have political positions or their
equivalents in the bureaucratic system even when they are managing the Chinese SOEs.
Thus, they are more sensitive to humiliating acts (which can be deemed quite natural by
Westerners, but seem to be insulting from the perspective of Chinese SOEs) and very
concerned about losing face, especially to the public.
C. DECISION-MAKING
In China, government directives and approvals pervade virtually all aspects of societal and
economic functioning.30 This is particularly true for Chinese SOEs because they are
under the government's control or supervision to a greater degree, even during this transi-
tion period. Therefore, negotiating with Chinese SOEs is more like a two-level game.
Though Western negotiators might not realize this situation, any tentative agreement
must be ratified or approved by the supervising authority of the Chinese SOE, be it a
larger parent SOE controlled by the central government or the central or local govern-
ment itself.
Similar to the two-level game of international negotiation, at Level I, the Chinese
SOE's representatives are bargaining with their Western counterparts with the hope of
formulating a business transaction. Afterwards, at Level II. (which is usually hidden from
outsiders), the executives of the Chinese SOE report the tentative deal to their supervising
authority to seek ratification or approval of the transaction. 3 1 Such ratification or ap-
proval can be any decision-making process, formal or informal, to endorse or implement a
Level I agreement.
In practice, the two levels of communications are more integrated. As Putnam noted
when analyzing international negotiation, "[t]here are likely to be prior consultations and
27. See disclaimer, supra note 15.
28. Combined with Chinese SOEs' face-saving culture, some reasons that a Westerner may believe are
perfectly fine to discuss may not appear this way to Chinese SOEs.
29. BLACKMAN, supra note 4, at 152.
30. Rosalie Tung, Negotiating with East Asia, in LN,,TERNATIONAL BUsiNESs NEQollA'rONs 369, 375
(Pervez N. Ghauri & Jean-Claude Usunier eds., Pergamon 1996).
31. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games, 42 I,',T"L ORG. 427,
436 (1998).
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bargaining at Level II to hammer out an initial position for the Level I negotiations.
Conversely, the need for Level II ratification is certain to affect the Level I bargaining. '32
"[Elxpectations of rejection at Level II may abort negotiations at Level I without" clear
reasons being understood by the Western negotiators. 33 After-the-fact objection at Level
II may also lead to "involuntary defection" of the Level I agreement.
IV. Possible Solutions
With such specific issues weighing on Chinese SOEs, Western firms easily get lost. To
facilitate better understanding between the parties, this paper tries to walk through each
stage of the negotiation in order to come up with possible solutions.
A. BEFORE NEGOTIATION
1. Avoid Stereotyping Chinese SOEs
As Goh points out, "relevant cross-cultural knowledge may help one in predicting beha-
viour, but one has to be constantly prepared for the unexpected." 34 This statement is
particularly true for negotiating with Chinese SOEs. Given that Chinese SOEs are in the
midst of transition and reform, which is conducted in different ways and implemented in
distinct stages, "Chinese SOEs can be very different" as mentioned by one of the inter-
viewees. 35 Therefore, stereotyping Chinese SOEs entails greater risk. Western negotia-
tors with Chinese SOEs as counterparts have to do their homework sufficiently, and more
importantly, they must continually analyze or adjust their assumptions.
2. Find an Appropriate Middle Man or Intermediary
An appropriate and effective middle man or intermediary who has an in-depth under-
standing of the backgrounds and operation of Chinese SOEs or the Chinese government
is extremely important for business negotiations between Western firms and Chinese
SOEs. As mentioned above, Chinese SOEs have their own language system or style of
communication, which can be vague, and may make use of "false authority" at times. In
such situations, the middle man or intermediary acts as a cultural interpreter and provides
a method of more accurately reading Chinese SOEs. As commented by Graham and
Lam, "[o]nly a native Chinese speaker can read and explain the moods, intonations, facial
expressions, and body language Chinese negotiators exhibit during a formal negotiation
session." 36 For Chinese SOEs, it is no secret that only those who have extensive experi-
ence in dealing with Chinese SOEs or the Chinese government can read between the lines
of Chinese SOEs' vague communications.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Goh, supra note 4, at 83.
35. See disclaimer, supra note 15.
36. John L. Graham & N. Mark Lam, The Chinese Negotiation, 81 HARv. Bus. Rrv. 82, 87 (2003).
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3. Conduct a Full-fledged Background Check
Before negotiating with Chinese SOEs, a first priority should be to understand the cur-
rently applicable "PRC condition" under the Chinese business culture framework. Given
that the Chinese government is the "biggest boss" for SOEs, the SOEs do business ac-
cording to the government's priorities, policies, and plans. Western firms should be sensi-
tive to the guiding principles of China's social and economic development as set forth by
the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese government. A careful study should be
conducted of the relevant Chinese policies, which can take the form of certain general or
abstract guidelines or even mere indications in some seemingly insignificant government
circulars. All of those resources can provide important indicators of what the Chinese
government's priorities or policies are.
Apart from Chinese government policy, various sorts of information about the Chinese
SOE (including, without limitation, whether it is a public company, how it has developed
to date, what reform is under way, whether it has any foreign strategic investors, and its
financial data and competitive information) should be fully researched. Nevertheless,
some of the data and information regarding Chinese SOEs can be either unavailable or
unreliable. 37 Thus, it is important to gather the critical information from every possible
resource. One of the key sources of practical information will be the middle man or inter-
mediary who introduced the representative of the western firm to the Chinese SOE in the
first place.38 It should be noted that knowing who will be bargaining within China, and




The complicated motivations of Chinese SOEs' executives are foreign to Western negoti-
ators. Their vague and indirect communication style drives Western negotiators crazy.
Moreover, the two-level game for decision-making lengthens the whole process and effec-
tively increases the uncertainty of what has been discussed and agreed upon at the negotia-
tion table. With all these factors combined, some Western negotiators cannot help
getting angry or yelling at their Chinese counterparts. Experience shows, however, that
getting angry ruins relationships, and "loud voices and irritated tones destroy even long-
standing interpersonal relationship." 39
Thus, patience will be the key. Western negotiators should be prepared for the re-
opening of previous issues (this is also part of the story for the two-level game) and should
understand that for Chinese SOEs it is really a package deal based on a long-term rela-
tionship; thereby "nothing is settled until everything is settled."
40
37. L.As & GRAi m, supra note 4, at 163.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 184.
40. Id. at 164.
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2. The Magic "Why"
Equipped with patience, Western negotiators have to ask as many "why" questions as
possible when negotiating with Chinese SOEs. Why did the Chinese SOE change the
negotiators today? Is that merely a scheduling conflict, or is there deeper bureaucratic
reasons for the change? Why do the Chinese SOE's representatives decline to give a
definitive answer? Is this really out of their scope of authority as claimed, or is their
behavior due to actual or anticipated difficulties, or even rejection, at Level II?
Seeking to answer these magic "why's" helps Western negotiators foster deeper com-
munications with Chinese SOEs, allowing the Westerners to ascertain numerous unspo-
ken points and reasons. Nevertheless, addressing magic "why" questions is highly
context-specific. Some "why's" can be directly posed to the Chinese counterparts at the
negotiation table, while others may only be conveyed through a sophisticated middle man
or intermediary. Some "why" questions may be resolved through in-house research, while
others can only be sorted out by consulting outside professionals.
A wrong choice of channels to convey such "why's" will lead to inferior results, from
failing to gain a real answer to offending the Chinese SOEs' representatives, or even de-
stroying the trust or long-term relationship between the parties. The rule of thumb for
the Chinese SOEs across the table is to save face. Further, in order to play it safe, it is
always a smart idea to consult with a trustworthy intermediary, professional service pro-
vider, or personnel who has extensive experience in dealing with Chinese SOEs before
posing the magic "why" questions.
3. Channels and Sequencing
The two-level game of negotiations used by Chinese SOEs presents particular difficulties
for Western firms. It is vital to find out the right channels in China and employ the
correct sequencing in dealing with different channels. Below are the three major paths
available for Western firms' negotiations with Chinese SOEs. Such paths may need to be
pursued separately in a certain order or simultaneously, depending on the transactions'
contexts.
a. Path I: General Trust-Building
The importance of trust-building in a business negotiation between Chinese SOEs and
Western firms cannot be over-emphasized. As Ghauri and Fang quoted one of their Chi-
nese negotiator interviewees, "'They [Western firms] want to come and sign the contract
quickly and do not know that [if] we do not understand each other.., there is no business
relationship. First, we have to know and trust each other, then we sign the contract."' 41
Such trust-building can be conducted through certain events (which have no specific
transaction-related tasks but are set up only for general trust-building purpose), such as
symbolic visits by top executives of Western firms, banquets or informal communications,
or Chinese delegations' visits to the Western firm's home country.42 This kind of general
trust-building can take place at different levels, not only with the executives of the Chi-
nese counterparty, but also with its immediate supervisor, or higher central authority.
41. Ghauri & Fang, supra note 1, at 314.
42. Id.
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In such trust-building events, an appropriate middle man or intermediary's function can
never be overlooked. An effective middle man or intermediary may have close connec-
tions or wide recognition with the Chinese counterparty or even relevant authorities. The
middle man, therefore, may be the person who introduces the relationship, builds up the
connections, arranges for a proper trust-building event, or serves as a cultural interpreter
to facilitate mutual understanding. Furthermore, such general trust-building can also pre-
pare the Western negotiators for in-depth communications through Paths II and III as
discussed below.
b. Path 11: Chief Negotiator at the Level I
As Putnam points out, "the chief negotiator is the only formal link between Level I and
Level II."43 Thus, the impact of the chief negotiator's preferences regarding Level II
decision-making cannot be underestimated. The chief negotiator can be an active lobbyist
for the transaction under discussion or a passive servant completely under the control of
the Level 11 decision-makers. Thus, how to effectively mobilize the chief negotiator be-
comes critical to most transactions between Chinese SOEs and Western firms.
It is critical to link the transaction with the chief negotiator's interests or priorities.
This goal may be conceptualized by asking how the transaction might enhance the chief
negotiator's "standing in the Level II game by increasing his political resources" or how
the transaction might contribute to the implementation of the chief negotiator's own con-
ception of the Chinese SOE and its interplay with the Level II players.44 In sum, similar
to the two-level game of international negotiation, the chief negotiator of a Chinese SOE
is more likely to recommend his superiors approve or ratify a deal if he has to invest less of
his own political capital to win the Level 1-approval while achieving greater political
returns for himself in the process.45
c. Path III: Constituencies at the Level II
Putnam also mentions that "the preferences of the chief negotiator may well diverge from
those of his constituents. '46 Although the chief negotiator sometimes can be mobilized as
an active lobbyist for the deal through Path II, he may sometimes also be a major hin-
drance to the deal if too much of his own political capital is at the stake and he is overcau-
tious, preferring no deal rather than a potentially wrong deal.
In such circumstances, it may be helpful to directly exert influence on the Level II
constituencies, align their interests in favor of the deal, and expect a top-down approach
by the Level H1 players to make the deal happen. This path can be difficult and tricky. It
is difficult because in most cases, the Level HI constituencies or players are not evident to
the Western firms or even other Chinese outsiders. It is tricky because if you cannot
successfully mobilize the Level 11 players, such a bypass action itself may sufficiently an-
noy the Level I players (especially the chief negotiator who may feel humiliated because
he is supposed to be the formal link between two levels) and lead to their resisting cooper-
ation in further rounds.
43. Putman, supra note 31, at 456.
44. Id. at 457.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 436.
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Therefore, Path mI has to be pursued discreetly. It would be imprudent to go too fast
or too far in this kind of persuasion of the Level 11 constituencies. Which Level H constit-
uent should be approached first, and through what channel? Which core issue should be
broached first, in what context, and to what extent? All these delicate factors play impor-
tant roles in a successful lobbying effort at Level I. Again, a sophisticated insider's view is
vital in making such delicate and discreet judgment calls.
C. AFTER NEGOTIATION
1. Be Prepared for After-contract Negotiation
The signing of a contract is never the end of the game in China. As Lee commented,
"[a]ll [Chinese] know what social harmony demands. Such knowledge comes from a wide
familiarity with custom rather than from formal books of case or statute law as in the
West."47 Similarly, for Chinese SOEs, their own custom of doing business is much more
important than the lifeless terms and conditions of a signed contract.
What further complicates the situation is the two-level game on the Chinese SOEs'
side. Sometimes the Level II players later feel unhappy about the deal and argue that they
were unaware of such commitments when rectifying or approving the deal. All these fac-
tors may lead to a possible reopening of negotiation at Level I or even an "involuntary
defection" of the Level I agreement. Thus, for a Western negotiator, the advice is not to
be overly exhilarated upon signing but rather to promptly prepare for possible after-con-
tract negotiations.
2. Long-Term Commitment and Informal Consultation
For most Chinese SOEs, "trust and harmony are more important than any piece of pa-
per."48 As advised by Lee, "[y]our [Westerners'] best legal defense in China is the good-
will that your Chinese business partners possess. This means that building long-term
trust relations with your Chinese counterparts becomes even more important." 49 This
advice is particularly true when dealing with Chinese SOEs whose "biggest boss" is the
Chinese government. Breaking the trust relations (which are never easy to build up) with
the Chinese SOEs is very dangerous and could potentially close off opportunities with the
particular Chinese SOE or other Chinese SOEs within the sector or community or other
involved parties, be they a superior and larger Chinese SOE or the relevant government
authorities. Therefore, ahead of any proposed reopening of negotiations after signing a
contract, the more strategic path is to continue to show long-term commitment, reinforce
the trust relations between the parties, and cooperate on mutually-acceptable solutions.
Although an international arbitration clause is usually included in contracts between
Western firms and Chinese SOEs, a Chinese approach to conflict resolution may still be
more effective. This path involves approaching the dispute from a cooperative standpoint
and communicating with the Chinese counterpart. If one has maintained the harmony
and trust and one has an honest mutual interest in the deal, problems can usually be
47. LEio., supra note 4, at 133.
48. LAiI & GRAHAM1, supra note 4, at 194.
49. L., sipra note 4, at 138.
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resolved through simple conferral.5 0 If the tension between the parties is so intense that
face-to-face renegotiation would be difficult, it is advisable to have the middle man or
intermediary mediate the problem by addressing both parties' concerns and helping them
determine possible solutions.
3. Choice of Forum and Dispute Resolution
In case the after-contract issue is so severe or the disparity between the parties' interests is
so material that informal consultation (either directly or through middle man) is not feasi-
ble, it is critical to have effective choice of forum and dispute resolution clauses in the
contract as a last resort. It should be noted that a formal dispute resolution mechanism is
always the last resort, as illustrated by the U.S. Department of Commerce advising its
companies that:
[W]hen a U.S. firm has a dispute with the Chinese [SOEJ . . . the most effective
initial step is to quietly raise the issue with the entities involved, citing the importance
of foreign companies' investment in China. The firm should explain its situation to
the Chinese entity, and offer to work with it to resolve the problem amicably. This
allows for a more aggressive approach at a later date, if necessary. 51
V. Conclusion
As compared with other Chinese entities of different ownership structure (i.e., POEs and
FIEs), Chinese SOEs present specific issues, including (1) complicated and interlinked
motivations, (2) vague and indirect communication patterns, and (3) a two-level game
decision-making process. These issues derive from the significant role the government
plays in Chinese SOEs and from the complex transition period the SOEs are operating in
and the various reforms they are carrying out. To address such issues, Western negotia-
tors need to be fully prepared and equipped with relevant strategies at different stages of
the entire process of negotiations.
Before the negotiation, it is vital to avoid stereotyping Chinese SOEs, to conduct a full-
fledged background check of relevant Chinese SOEs and the current PRC condition, and
to locate a trustworthy and sophisticated middle man or intermediary (whose functions
can be very important in various stages of the negotiation). During the negotiation, West-
ern negotiators need to remain patient and equip themselves with the magic "why" ques-
tions, while attempting to win the two-level game through various channels or paths,
which can be pursued either separately or simultaneously as the context requires. After
the contract is signed (usually following lengthy negotiations between the Chinese SOE
and the Western firm), it is still too early to feel great relief. Western firms should be
prepared for any after-contract renegotiation, and they should be prepared to resolve any
conflicts using a Chinese approach, which is generally more effective, although a valid
formal dispute resolution clause must be included in the contract as a possible last resort.
50. LA\i & GRAuAu, svpra note 4, at 197.
51. U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, U.S. COMMERCIAL SERV., DiSPIuFE AVOIDANCF AND DISPUTE RESOLU-
"F]ON IN CmINA 7 (2003), available at http://www.export.gov/china/exporting-to china/disputeavoidanceand
resolution.pdf.
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This paper serves as an initial effort to distinguish Chinese entities' negotiation styles
by their ownership structure. Business negotiations between Chinese SOEs and Western
firms were specifically analyzed due to the greater difference between these two entities
(as compared with the difference between the other two types of Chinese entities-POEs
and FIEs-and Western firms) and the fact that more business encounters between these
two entities can be envisaged, given the Chinese SOEs' strength and ambition within the
global economy. Given the limited scope of this paper, large-scale empirical research was
not included. Rather, the paper's findings are based on interviews with several profes-
sional practitioners and business insiders.
With more empirical research in this sector, more in-depth and insightful findings can
be drawn, which can hopefully contribute to increasing the understanding between Chi-
nese SOEs and Western firms. In addition, further research into the specific negotiation
styles of the other two types of Chinese entities (i.e., POEs and FIEs) will also help to
generate a full picture of the Chinese entities' different negotiation styles based on owner-
ship structure. Such continuing and deeper efforts in the area of Sino-Western business
negotiation will facilitate the increasing of business transactions between Chinese and
Westerners.
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